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Abstract
We reformulate the classic CSV model of financial contracting from Townsend
(1979) and Gale & Hellwig (1985) to tackle criticisms raised against it, such as
lack of subgame-perfectness at the repayment stage and its inability to encompass
equity contracts. The implications drawn are shown to be consistent with empirical
regularities, such as strategic defaults of debt obligations, firms being financed by
a mix of debt and equity, violations of absolute priority rules, and a low debt ratio
for high risk projects.
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1 Introduction
Financial contracts typically do not specify repayments to investors as a detailed function
of all payoﬀ relevant variables. For example, debt contracts normally do not specify
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repayments as a detailed function of the financial state of the firm, but rather puts some
easily describable liability on the firm’s cash flow through a fixed repayment obligation.
One focal approach in the literature that attempts to model this feature of financial
contracts is the Costly State Verification (CSV) approach. The core of this approach
is that, upon the date of repayment, inside investors have superior information to the
outside investors about the profitability of the firm, and therefore may try to divert cash
from outside investors. Of course, this may in turn create an ex-ante governance problem
in that external investors may be reluctant to finance the firm. The weapon outside
investors can use to mitigate the cash diversion problem is to partially or fully verify the
true profitability of the firm, by e.g., demanding an audit, declaring bankruptcy, or even
discharge management and take control of the operations of the firm. Such a leveling of
information can only take place at a certain cost of verification. Celebrated papers by
Townsend (1979) and Gale & Hellwig (1985) derive debt contracts as optimal contract
under such circumstances, i.e., contracts which promises a fixed repayment, and where
the creditor verifies whenever the oﬀered repayment falls below the promised repayment.
In spite of its elegance, the classroom CSV model suﬀers from several shortcomings.
First, as pointed out by Hart (1995) and others, the debt contract derived under CSV
relies on a commitment on the part of the lender to verify whenever the debt is not repaid
in full, even if accepting a concession would be better for the lender, since verification is
costly. As such, the equilibrium supporting the ’optimal contract’ may involve non-Nash
strategies to be played by the creditor in default states, and — perhaps equally importantly
— implies that the model cannot accommodate strategic defaults of debt obligations by
the borrower. Second, as also pointed out by Hart (1995), while in practice debt typically
coexists with equity as a financial claim on the firm, the standard CSV model is unable
to explain the use of outside equity, and hence unable to account for capital structures
with both debt and outside equity on the balance sheet.1
The purpose of the present paper is to recast the CSV model in response to the
criticisms above, where two important alterations compared to Townsend (1979) and Gale
1Indeed, as noted by Townsend (1979), ”the [CSV] model as it stands may contribute to our un-
derstanding of closely held firms, but cannot explain the coexistence of publicly held shares and debt.”
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& Hellwig (1985) is to require subgame perfectness and allow for stochastic monitoring
at the repayment stage. We show that the manager oﬀers the lender a debt repayment
that depends on the true cash-flow of the firm, and the lender monitors with a probability
that is increasing in the magnitude of the default. This lenience on part of the lender
implies that there can be strategic defaults of debt repayments in equilibrium, in that the
borrower defaults on his debt obligation even though he has suﬃcient cash on hand to
avoid a default.
We also introduce outside equity in the CSV setting. While debt involves a fixed
payment being promised to the outside investor, equity is issued with a promise to the
investor of a fixed fraction of firm’s cash flow. This fractional cash flow right is in turn
supported by an unconditional right for the investor to intervene and verify. In the resul-
tant equilibrium, the payout proposed to the investor by the entrepreneur is increasing in
the true cash flow, and the investor monitors with a probability that is decreasing in the
size of the proposed payout.
Combining debt and equity in the model allows us to consider the possibility of a joint
debt and equity financing (where debt is the senior claimant), and to thereby pin down
the optimal capital structure. We show that the optimal capital structure can consist of
a mixture of debt and equity. Moreover, we show that the model is consistent with the
optimal debt-equity ratio decreasing in the riskiness of the firm.
When a financing mix is optimal, violations of absolute priority rules can occur in
equilibrium (for low realizations of the cash flow) in that outside equity receives a positive
repayment even if creditors are not repayed in full. It may be noted here that the literature
generating AP-violations (e.g., Bebchuk, 2002) deals with AP-violations vis a vis the inside
owner-entrepreneur. In our setting, there are AP-violations in the sense that both inside
and outside equity receive positive payments even though debt is not paid in full.
The literature has taken alternative routes to solve the dilemma posed by the lack of
subgame perfectness of the basic CSV contracts.2 For example, Krasa & Villamil (2000)
2Gale and Hellwig (1989) impose subgame perfection in a signaling game where the cash flow is fully
revealed through the repayment oﬀer from the inside investor to the outside investor. However, in Gale &
Hellwig (1989) contracting plays no explicit role, while in contrast we allow for (debt or equity) contracts
to be written on payoﬀs in the verification state. Reinganum & Wilde (1986) consider a closely related
tax-evasion game, where a tax payer submits an income statement to the IRS, and the IRS may decide
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restrict the strategy space of the borrower to oﬀering the lender either the full repayment
or a zero repayment, deriving debt as the optimal contract under no commitment on the
part of the lender. This restriction simplifies the inference problem of the lender to the
point of ensuring that he will want to verify whenever the borrower defaults on the debt
contract (i.e. oﬀers a zero repayment) so long as the verification cost that the lender must
pay is not too high. In contrast, we place no apriori restrictions on the strategy space (i.e.,
the ’reports’) of the borrower other than limited liability, but rule out the possibility of the
lenders oﬀering non-linear contracts, which is consistent with debt and equity as observed
in practice. Persons (1997) imposes subgame perfectness and stochastic monitoring in
a CSV setting, as we do, but restricts attention to the two-state case, and construct
examples where optimal contracts may involve the manager misreporting the true cash
flow in the high state. Due to our richer state space, such equilibria are non-existent in
our setting.
There is a literature on strategic defaults and AP-violations that will be further com-
mented upon in the text. Others who consider outside equity and debt financing under
incomplete contracting includes Fluck (1998), Myers (2000), and Anderson & Nyborg
(2001), which operate in a symmetric-unverifiable information setup á la Grossman &
Hart (1986) and Hart & Moore (1989). However, these papers focus on dynamic issues of
repayment and do not derive an optimal mix of debt and outside equity.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic model is presented.
In Section 3 pure debt financing is considered, and in Section 4 pure equity financing. In
Section 5 we examine a mix of debt and equity. Concluding remarks are given in Section
6.
to audit (but cannot precommit to an audit policy). The main diﬀerence to our setting is that the
’contract’ between a tax-payer and the IRS (proportional taxation with a penalty for misreporting) is
exogenously imposed by a third party (the ’policy makers’) rather than being determined by competitive
forces. Finally, Povel and Raith (2002) examine a setting where a firm’s cash flow is unobservable to
the creditor, and intervention by the investor has no cost to him, but leads to a loss in future benefits
to manager. As with Gale & Hellwig (1989) and Reinganum & Wilde (1986), their setting is diﬀerent
because the verification state payoﬀs are not contracted upon.
3Boyd & Smith (1999) show that the optimal contract in a CSV type of setting can involve a mix of
debt and equity. However, the payoﬀ to outside equity in their paper is only supported by the observable
part of the firm’s cash flow, and hence their paper cannot explain the use of equity financing to projects
that generate unobservable cash-flows.
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2 The basic setup
There are two stages, the investment stage and the payoﬀ stage. Let the cash flow x in
the payoﬀ stage be a stochastic variable with density function f(x), x ∈ [xL, xH ], where
0 < xL < xH . The expected cash flow
R xH
xL
xf(x)dx is denoted by Ex, the required
investment amount is given by I, and the NPV of the project (gross of verification costs)
is hence Ex − I. The riskless interest rate is zero, and all agents are assumed to be
risk neutral. Contracts can only specify payouts to the investors in the verification state.
A (pure) debt contract specifies the payout to the creditor as min[D, x], where D is the
contractible variable. A (pure) equity contract specifies the payout to the outside equity
holder as βx, where β ∈ (0, 1] is the contractible variable. In either case, the entrepreneur
is the residual claimant. The entrepreneur operates in a competitive market for financing,
and has a choice between debt financing and equity financing. In Section 5, we consider
the case where the entrepreneur may finance the project through a mix of debt and equity.
The realized cash flow is observed freely by the entrepreneur-manager, but can be
observed by the outside investors only at a positive cost, denoted by cD for debt, and cE
for equity. One interpretation is that cD is a bankruptcy cost, and that cE is the cost
for outside equity holders of taking control of the firm.4 Less dramatically, cD and cE
could reflect the creditors’ and the outside equity holders’ respective cost for performing
a thorough audit. For several reasons, it is diﬃcult to put any tight restrictions on
the relative magnitude of cD and cE, one being that debt and equity holders may have
diﬀerent information about the operations of the firm.5 At this point, we therefore merely
assume that 0 < cD, cE < xL, i.e., that there is liquidity in the firm ex post to cover the
verification cost.6
4We are implicitly assuming that the manager does not lose private benefits from the shareholders
taking control, and that the outside option of the manager (other career options) are independent of
whether the shareholders take control or not. These assumptions simplify the analysis, but do not change
the qualitative insights. A related change of assumptions would take into account managerial moral
hazard, by modeling managerial eﬀort or risk taking as a function of the financial structure. This issue
is commented upon later.
5Another reason for cE being diﬀerent from cD is that since the control rights for debt and equity
diﬀer, creditors and equity holders may have diﬀerent incentives to invest in a cheap monitoring technology
ex-ante.
6The liquidity restriction cD, cE < xL could be made endogenous by requring the entrepeneur to
borrow more than I, in order to keep a liquidity reserve for bad states.
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For clarity of exposition, we first consider pure debt financing in Section 3, then
consider pure equity financing in Section 4, and finally consider the possibility of a mixture
between debt and equity in Section 5.
3 Pure Debt Financing
Debt is issued with a face value D ∈ <++, along with a right on the part of the lender to
verify (intervene) if D is not paid in full. We assume that the creditor will be reimbursed
for the costs of collecting the contracted payment D, with D representing the maximum
amount that the creditor can collect net of verification costs. Thus, while the contract
specifies a payoﬀ min[D, x], the creditor obtains min[D + cD, x] − cD = min[D, x − cD]
after verification.7
First the parties agree upon a debt obligation D (taken as given at this point). Then
the true cash flow is realized and observed privately by the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur
makes a repayment oﬀer D˜ : [xL, xH ] → [0, xH ]. We impose limited liability on the
entrepreneur, so that D˜ ≤ x. Notice that the entrepreneur making a repayment oﬀer
D˜ < D is equivalent to proposing for the creditor to make a concession D−D˜ on the debt
claim. Given an oﬀer D˜ < D by the entrepreneur, the creditor either accepts or rejects
the concession proposal. If the creditor accepts, he receives D˜, and the manager gets the
residual x − D˜. If the creditor rejects, he verifies and receives a payoﬀ according to the
written contract.8 A strategy for the creditor is an accept probability Q(D˜), where Q(.)
is a mapping from the set of possible repayments [0, xH ] to a probability on [0, 1].9 For
7This feature is consistent with the bankruptcy law in most countries. At any extent our results would
be exactly the same if the creditor pays the verification cost, and qualitatively the same if the creditor
receives the full cash flow after misreporting (see Appendix C).
8Potentially, there is a third action open to the creditor, namely to put a counter-oﬀer on the table.
By neglecting the possibility of such counter-oﬀers, we are implicitly assuming that the cost of making
such counter-oﬀers are significant. An alternative assumption that would give the same conclusion is
that the costs of making counter-oﬀers are large relative to the cost for the manager to make counter-
counter-oﬀers, so that the solution of a Rubinstein (1982) type of bargaining game between the manager
and the creditor would give the creditor less than accepting the oﬀer D˜. Our approach here is similar to
that in Anderson & Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral & Perraudin (1997). Fan & Sundaresan (2000)
consider a setting which allows for varying relative bargaining strength of the inside equity holders and
the creditors.
9Q(D˜) = 0 corresponds to the pure strategy of rejecting (verifying) an oﬀer D˜, and Q(D˜) = 1
corresponds to a pure strategy of accepting an oﬀer D˜.
6
D˜ ≥ D, the contract dictates that Q(D˜) = 1. For D˜ < D, then Q(D˜) is the probability
that the creditor accepts the concession on the debt claim proposed by the manager.
We rule out pre-commitment in the verification strategy Q(.) by considering subgame-
perfect equilibria that involves Nash play in all reachable subgames (each possible oﬀer
by the manager is the starting node of a diﬀerent subgame).10 Such subgame perfect
equilibria must involve stochastic monitoring by the creditor for D˜ < D.11 Consequently,
for D˜(x) to be part of an equilibrium, the creditor must be indiﬀerent between accepting





x− cD for x ∈ [xL,D + cD]
D, for x ∈ [D + cD, xH ]
(1)
Since the function D˜(x) is strictly increasing for x ∈ [xL,D + cD], an oﬀer implicitly
defines a reported cash flow, x˜.
For a subgame perfect equilibrium to exist, the question is now whether there exists
a function Q(.) such that the manager has incentives to play the strategy in (1). It turns
out that there exists a unique solution to this problem, which moreover can be given a
closed-form characterization.
Denote the manager’s utility as a function of the ’report’ x˜ [with an implied oﬀer
min(D, x˜ − cD)] and the true state x by U(x˜;x), for simplicity just written U(x˜). For
the manager’s incentive-compatibility constraint to hold, it must be the case that U(x˜) is
maximized for x˜ = x. The manager has no interest in oﬀering the lender a payment that
exceeds D, and the lender’s right to demand verification is contingent on oﬀers less than
D. Consider therefore values of x˜ on the interval [xL, D + cD], and let d := x− x˜ be the
magnitude of cash flow misreporting. First consider the case x ∈ [xL, D + cD]. We then
10The assumption of no pre-commitment seems plausible for bank or venture capital type of debt,
where the relation between the borrower and the lender is of close character, and where concessions made
are not necessarily observed by the market, and hence induces no loss of reputation for the creditor.
11Deterministic monitoring, assumed in Townsend (1979) and Gale & Hellwig (1985), would imply that
an oﬀer slightly less than D would have to be rejected by the creditor, which would not be optimal play
by the creditor given that the subgame is reached. But if the creditor would accept slightly less than D,
the borrower would have incentives to oﬀer even less, and so forth. Hence there cannot exist subgame
perfect debt equilibrium under deterministic verification.
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have that,
U(bx) = Q(x˜)[cD + d] + [1−Q(x˜)]0 (2)
= Q(x˜)[cD + d]
In words, since the manager gets nothing if the creditor rejects the concession pledge,
the expected utility of the manager after making a report x˜ just equals the concession
proposal (cD+d) multiplied by the probability of the creditor accepting the proposal. We







[cD + d]−Q(x˜) = 0 (3)




cD = 0 (4)




where K is an integration constant. Using the corner condition Q(D+ cD) = 1,13 we can







cD , x˜ ∈ [xL, D + cD]
1, for x˜ ∈ [D + cD, xH ]
(6)
This accept function induces truth-telling for x = D + cD, and it can easily be shown
12The equilibrium Q(.) function must be continuous. Were it not for some x, the manager would be
made better oﬀ by setting the announced x slightly higher than the true x (to thereby pay out only
slightly more but have discontinuos jump in accept probability).
13This condition follows from the continuity requirement mentioned in the previous footnote.
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that it also must induce truth-telling for x > D+ cD.14 Hence we then have the following
result.
Proposition 1 (Debt) In equilibrium, the manager oﬀers D˜ = D if x ≥ D + cD. If









The true cash flow of the firm is on the horizontal axis, and the accept probability of
the creditor on the vertical axis. The function Q(x) is the equilibrium accept probability,
given that the oﬀer from the lender is represented by the function D˜(x) in (1). The
accept probability Q(.) is inversely related to the extent of the default D − x, which is
intuitive because understating the true cash flow must be costly to induce truth-telling.15
It implies that the lender will be less lenient with firms with large defaults. If we think
of the lender accepting the entrepreneur’s oﬀer as the firm successfully restructuring its
debt out of court and the lender rejecting the oﬀer as the firm going to formal bankruptcy
(under e.g., Ch. 11), then the proposition implies that firms are more likely to enter
formal bankruptcy the larger their default.
14To see that the second order condition for maximum is satisfied, diﬀerentiate U(bx) twice with respect
to xˆ, which yields
Q(.)
c2D
(d− cD) which is clearly negative for d = 0.
15The intuition for convexity of Q(.) is that it is more tempting for the manager to underreport the
cash flow when x is relatively high, so that the steepness of Q(.) must be higher for higher reports.
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Notice that the borrower, expecting the lender to be lenient with defaults (with positive
probability), for x ∈ [D,D+ cD] has an incentive to oﬀer a lower repayment than D even
though he has suﬃcient cash to avoid default. In other words, we get strategic defaults
in equilibrium for x ∈ [D,D + cD].16
The leniency on the part of the lender can be seen as an absolute priority violation (AP-
violation), since it implies that the borrower receives a positive payoﬀ (with probability
Q(.)) even though the lender is not paid the full value of his debt contract. In a recent
contribution, Bebchuck (2002) studies the eﬀects of AP-violations on the ex-ante risk
shifting incentives of borrowers, finding that debt that permits AP-violations induces
stronger risk shifting incentives than debt that does not. The eﬀect identified by Bebchuck
can be generated in the present setting as well.17 One important diﬀerence between the
two setups is that while AP-violations in his setup are imposed exogenously by giving the
borrower a fixed fraction of the firm’s assets in any default state, the AP-violations in the
present setting arise endogenously, due to the frictions created by the verification costs.
We should emphasize that the perhaps the most plausible interpretation of the mixed
strategy played by the creditor is that the entrepreneur faces a market of possible fi-
nanciers, and where each financier may play a pure strategy on when to verify (e.g.,
to verify for any default larger than z, where z is some positive constant), so that the
mixed strategy reflects the average behavior played by potential creditors, not the strat-
egy played by each possible creditor. Under this interpretation, the oﬀer function D˜(x)
is a best response to the average or expected play by creditors, not necessarily the best
response to the particular creditor played.18 The same interpretation is applicable to the
16Esty and Megginson (2001) in an empirical analysis of international lending syndicates argue that
syndicates are structured to deter strategic defaults rather than to improve monitoring incentives of
lenders.
17By showing that debt with AP-violations may induce stronger risk shifting incentives than debt
without AP-violations, Bebchuck (2002) identifies an important ex-ante cost of allowing for AP-violations.
It may be noted though that this insight is generated by comparing a riskless project to that of a risky (less
valuable) project. Although using a riskless project as benchmark provides for a clean experiment, the
eﬀects on ex-ante risk shifting incentives from AP-violations become more ambigous once the benchmark
project is assumed risky as well. In such a case, whether AP-violations will generate greater or less
risk shifting incentives will depend on factors such as the amount of debt that the firm issues and the
underlying returns generating distribution.
18This is a standard interpretation of mixed strategy equilibria in the game-theoretic literature, see
e.g., Rubinstein (1991).
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equilibrium we derive under pure equity and under mixed financing.
We have assumed that verification state payoﬀs can only depend on x. Alternatively,
we could enrich the contractual space by allowing verification state payoﬀs to depend
both on x (resources available) as before, and the report x˜ (this assumes that reports
are contractible). Specifically, the contract could specify a punishment for the manager if
caught lying (x˜ 6= x), an idea explored by Mookherjee & Png (1989) and Persons (1997).
In Appendix C, we consider such contracts and show that they would yield qualitatively
the same results as the current contracts.
4 Pure Equity Financing
We model outside equity as a linear contract that gives the investor a fractional right,
β ∈ (0, 1], to the firm’s cash flow. Linearity is consistent with laws protecting minor-
ity shareholders, in that a smaller ownership share should give proportionally the same
cash flow rights (interpreted broadly, as dividends, liquidation proceeds, or a takeover
premium) as a larger ownership share.19
As with D in the case of debt financing, β will be determined by the funding require-
ment and the outside investor’s participation constraint, but can be viewed as exogenous
at this point. The cash flow right associated with equity is supported by an unconditional
right for the outside shareholder to intervene.20 We furthermore assume that the verifi-
cation cost under outside equity is borne by the investor.21 This assumption implies for
example that a shareholder cannot be reimbursed for costs of engaging in a proxy contest.
A strategy by the entrepreneur is an oﬀer-function E˜(x), where E˜ : [xL, xH ]→ [0, xH ],
19The presence of executive options, which presumably are exercised when the firm is doing well, would
generate concavity in the outside investors’ payout. This issue is left for future research.
20The combination fractional cash flow right and unconditional right to intervene is consistent with
equity as observed in practice, and is the same type of approach as e.g., Myers (2000) and Andersen &
Nyborg (2001).
21With the exception of Proposition 4, our results do not depend on this formulation. For example,
letting the insider absorb the verification cost instead gives similar results except that the shareholder is
then oﬀered E˜(x) = βx in equilibrium, rather than E˜(x) = βx− cE. The equilibrium accept probability,
given β, is independent of who bears the intervention cost cE ex post. However, the required ownership
fraction β in the alternative formulation will be less, since the investor receives βx in equilibrium rather
than βx − cE. This gives a higher accept probability P (.) and hence lower expected verification costs,
but apart from that does not change our results qualitatively.
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and E˜ ≤ x. A strategy for the equity holder is an accept function P (E˜). As with debt,
we consider subgame perfect equilibria of the game between the manager and the equity
holder.22 Given the cash flow right β, and the assumption that the intervention costs
is covered by the investor, the investor receives βx − cE in net payoﬀ if he decides to
intervene, where cE is the intervention cost. Analogous to the case of pure debt financing,
in a subgame perfect equilibrium the outside owner must be indiﬀerent between verifying
and not verifying. Thus, for a given β, we must have that,
E˜(x) = βx− cE (7)
Since the function E˜(x) in (7) is strictly increasing, an oﬀer implicitly defines a reported
cash flow, x˜. The question again is whether there exists a function P (x˜) such that truthful
reporting is indeed obtained in equilibrium. Imposing the corner condition P (xH) = 1,
this problem conveniently turns out to have a unique solution, which can be given a
closed-form characterization.
Proposition 2 (Outside equity) In equilibrium, the manager oﬀers the investor βx −
cE, and the investor accepts the manager’s oﬀer with probability P (x) = e
−β xH−x
cE , x ∈
[xL, xH ].
Proof. See Appendix A.
The probability of the outside equity holder intervening is decreasing in the size of the
payment that the entrepreneur oﬀers. This is intuitive, the higher the earnings and the
higher the dividend payout the less is the chance that shareholders will find it necessary
to intervene. Note also that there is a positive probability of intervention for all x, in
contrast to what the case is with debt financing.
As can readily be seen, for a given x˜, the shareholder’s accept probability P (x˜) is
decreasing in his ownership stake β. Intuitively, higher outside ownership increases the
potential for the insider to divert cash away from the outsider by under-reporting the
true cash flow, which in turn forces the outsider to intervene with a greater probability
22Meaning that the shareholders cannot precommit to a monitoring strategy, see e.g., Admati & Pflei-
derer (1994) for a similar type of assumption.
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in order to induce truth-telling. The straightforward implication is that a higher outside
ownership implies more active owners, in terms of intervening more frequently.
We may notice that β cannot be arbitrarily small for equity financing to work, because
there must be suﬃcient incentives for the equity holder to intervene after being oﬀered a
(low) payment.23 As we shall see later, this property of equity implies that small projects
(a low I) will be 100% debt financed.
We now turn to the case where the firm may be both debt and equity financed.
5 Capital Mix
We now consider the possibility of the entrepreneur issuing both debt and equity to
finance the project. We take the creditor to be the senior claimant and the outside equity
holder to be the junior claimant, meaning that the entrepreneur settles his accounts with
the creditor before proposing a payout to the outside equity holder. The objective of
the manager is to pick the financial structure that minimizes expected verification costs,
subject to the constraint that the outside investors are willing to participate.
First, the manager funds the amount I with a fraction α in the form of debt and
(1− α) in the form of equity, where α ∈ [0, 1], and D and β are agreed upon.24 The cash
flow is then realized and observed only by the manager. Upon observing the true cash
flow, the manager oﬀers a debt repayment D˜ to the creditor, which the creditor accepts
with probability q(D˜). If the creditor rejects the oﬀer, he incurs the cost cD and gets
the net payout min[D, x − cD], while the equity holder gets max[0, β(x −D − cD)]. The
entrepreneur’s payoﬀ is the residual. If the creditor accepts the manager’s oﬀer D˜, the
manager proceeds to the shareholder with a repayment oﬀer E˜, which the shareholder
23More specifically, if β <
cE
xL
then the equity holder will not have incentives to monitor when xL
is (truthfully) reported. But then the manager will always report xL and an equilibrium cannot exist.
Hence equity financing implies that β ≥ cE
xL
>> 0. If a liquidity reserve can be provided ex-ante, by e.g.,
the outside investors providing more than I, then the minimum β can be decreased, but must still be
bounded away from zero.
24The two contracts β and D are assumed to be agreed upon in a manner that excludes opportunistic
behavior by a subset of the three agents at the contracting stage. Stylistically, we can think of the
manager solving for the optimal β and D (that satisfies the participation constraints), and then oﬀering
and signing the two contracts simultaneously.
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accepts with probability p(E˜).25 If the shareholder accepts the oﬀer E˜, the manager
retains x − D˜ − E˜. If the shareholder rejects the oﬀer, and verifies, the shareholder
receives β(x− D˜)− cE, and the manager gets the residual. We assume that the creditor
by accepting waives any future rights to the cash flow.26
If a (subgame perfect) equilibrium with a mixed capital structure exists, it must have a
similar structure to the equilibria of pure debt and pure equity, in that the manager oﬀers
repayments that (implicitly) reveals the true cash flow, and where the creditor and the
shareholder play a mixed strategy in certain states. We first derive the accept probability
functions q(.) and p(.) of debt and equity, respectively, taking the capital structure α as
given and on the interior of (0,1). Then we derive results on the optimal capital structure.
For the creditor’s indiﬀerence condition to hold, it must as under pure debt financing





x− cD for x ∈ [xL,D + cD]
D, for x ∈ [D + cD, xH ]
(8)
Given this strategy, now consider the equity subgame. Consider first the case in which
the manager does not default on his debt obligation (by oﬀering D˜ = D), in which case
the creditor has no choice but to accept the oﬀer. After D is paid out to the creditor,
the manager proceeds to the shareholder with an oﬀer E˜, where E˜ ∈ [0, x −D]. For the
equity holder’s indiﬀerence condition to hold,
E˜(x) = β(x−D)− cE (9)
Again, this oﬀer implicitly contains a report x˜. For truthful reporting to occur in this
subgame, it must be the case that p(x˜) = P (x˜), ∀x˜, i.e., the solution to the equity subgame
is identical to the equilibrium of the pure equity financing case, considered in the previous
25By conditioning p only on E˜, we are implicitly assuming that the equity holder does not observe D˜,
only whether the creditor chose to verify or not.The case where D˜ is observable to the equity holder,
so that p is a function of both E˜ and D˜, has qualitatively similar properties, but is algebraically more
complex, and is considered in Appendix D.
26This is consistent with bankruptcy law as practiced in e.g., the U.S. where repudiation is limited to
situations under which the creditor can show that he was coerced to accept the firm’s oﬀer (see Berglöf,
Roland, and von Thadden (2000) for a discussion).
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section. This observation is proved in Appendix A.
Consider now the case where the manager pledges for a debt concession, by oﬀering
D˜ < D. Conditional on the creditor accepting the oﬀer D˜ < D, there remains cD
(= x − D˜) of the cash-flow, and the equity holder is oﬀered βcD − cE, which he accepts
with probability p(D + cD) := p¯.
If the equity holder was expected to never verify after a debt concession (i.e., p¯ = 1)
then q(.) = Q(.), i.e., the creditor would follow the same monitoring strategy as under pure
debt financing (treatingD as fixed). However, since the shareholder will have incentives to
monitor after a concession (i.e., p¯ < 1), the creditor is more lenient under mixed financing
than under pure debt financing. Hence the main new feature of the accept functions under
a mixture is that, holding D constant, the creditor will be more lenient, because he takes
into account that the shareholder will also monitor. Formally, we have the following.
Proposition 3 (Capital mix) In equilibrium, if x ≥ D + cD, the entrepreneur oﬀers D
to the creditor and β(x−D)− cE to the shareholder, which the shareholder accepts with
probability p(x) = P (x) = e−β
xH−x
cE .
If x < D+cD, the entrepreneur oﬀers x−cD to the creditor, which the creditor accepts
with probability q(x) = eψ(x−D−cD), where ψ := (1−β)+p¯β
(1−β)cD+p¯cE .
Proof. See Appendix A.








The true cash flow of the firm is on the horizontal axis, and the accept probabilities on
the vertical axis. The function q(x) is the equilibrium accept probability by the creditor,
given that the oﬀer from the lender is represented by the function D˜(x). The function p(x)
is the equilibrium accept probability by the shareholder (recall that he is given an oﬀer
only if the creditor has accepted), given that the oﬀer from the lender is represented by
(12). For x < D+ cD, there is a positive probability of the creditor monitoring, while the
probability of the shareholder monitoring (conditional on the creditor not monitoring) is
constant (since the repayments are the same). For x ≥ D+ cD, there is a zero probability
of the creditor verifying, and a positive (and decreasing) probability of the shareholder
verifying. Hence, there is a division of labor in equilibrium: the creditor has the role of
disciplining the entrepreneur in bad states, and the shareholder has the role of disciplining
the entrepreneur in good states.
Priority violations occur in equilibrium, since in the region x ∈ [xL, D+ cD] the lender
will accept payments less thanD without demanding a verification (with probability q(x)),
and at the same time the repayment to the shareholder is strictly positive. As before,
strategic defaults occur in equilibrium for x ∈ [D,D+ cD], by which the manager defaults
even though the firm has suﬃcient cash on hand to pay out the full debt value D.
These results are of some interest, as strategic defaults and violations of priority rules
are common explanations for why risk premia on corporate debt significantly exceed those
implied by Merton (1974). Strategic defaults occur in the present setting because it is
costly for the creditor to collect his payment as specified by the contract. The presence
of this cost puts a suﬃcient wedge between the creditor’s proper payment under the
contract and what the insider is actually willing to oﬀer, thus leading to strategic defaults
for x ∈ [D,D+cD]. As shown by Bergman & Callen (1991) and Mella-Barral & Perraudin
(1997) a similar type of eﬀect can occur in symmetric information models, where there is
some costs for outside investors to invoke bankruptcy. It may be pointed out, however,
that in the present setting, there are AP-violations in the sense that both inside and
outside equity receive positive payments even though debt is not paid in full, while the
literature on AP-violations (including the papers referred to above) focuses on inside
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equity.27
For a mixed capital structure equilibrium to exist, we must have that βcD ≥ cE. On
the left hand side of this expression is the payoﬀ for the shareholder if he verifies (given
a low cash flow), and on the right hand side is his cost of entering the verification state.
If the right hand side exceeds the left hand side it would not pay for the shareholder to
monitor after the manager announces a low cash flow, in which case the manager would
have incentives to misreport the true cash flow, and an equilibrium with a mixed capital
structure cannot exist. From this observation there follows two necessary conditions for
a mix to occur. First, the equity holder’s stake β in the firm must be bounded away
from zero (i.e., β ≥ cE
cD
). This is consistent with the idea from Admati et al. (1994)
that to be eﬀective monitors each shareholder must hold a suﬃcient stake in the firm to
cover private monitoring costs. The second condition for mix to occur — which follows
from β ∈ (0, 1], is that cE < cD. Although we are not aware of systematical empirical
work comparing the monitoring cost of debt and equity, the result is consistent with the
argument of Habib and Johnsen (2000), who suggests that outside equity specializes on
gathering information about the firm in its primary use and debt on its alternative use
(which may include the firm’s liquidation value), and hence that equity is better informed
about x.
5.1 Optimal Capital Structure
Let us now analyze the optimal capital structure, where we can obtain some insights
although closed-form solutions are not feasible. For a given D and β, the expected veri-
fication cost is given by,
V (D, β) = cD
Z D+cD
xL
[1− q(x; .)]f(x)dx+ cE
Z D+cD
xL





27The empirical literature on AP-violations (e.g., Franks & Torous, 1989) obtains measures of the sum
of AP-violations of internal and external junior claimants.
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The first two terms is the expected verification costs for low cash flows (x ∈ [xL, D+ cD]),
and the third term is the expected verification cost for high cash flows (x ∈ [D+ cD, xH ]).
The objective of the entrepreneur is to pick the α that minimizes this expression, subject
to the participation constraints of the investors. Notice that for α = 0, i.e., pure equity
financing, the first and the second term in (10) drop. For α = 1, pure debt financing, the
second and the third term of (10) drop, and q(x; .) ≡ Q(x; .).
The first observation we can make about optimal capital structure follows from the
necessary condition for mix βcD ≥ cE.
Proposition 4 Firms with a low funding requirement will be financed by debt only.
Proof. For outside equity holders to have incentives to monitor, they must have an
ownership share that exceeds
cE
cD
. This implies that the (expected) verification cost is
discontinuous in the point IE = 0, where IE := (1−α)I. On the other hand, the expected
verification cost is continuous in the point ID = 0. This implies that firms with a low
funding requirement (low I) will be 100% debt financed
So far we have taken D and β as exogenous. To make further headway we need to
include the outside investors’ participation constraints, and endogenize D and β. For the
creditor’s participation constraint to hold, his expected payout must equal his financing





Df(x)dx = αI (11)
Notice that the creditor’s expected utility is a function of D, but not β, since debt is the






[β(x−D)− cE]f(x)dx = (1− α)I (12)
28It can easily be verified that the participation constraints must be binding.
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To find the optimal capital structure, it is more convenient to let D rather than α be
the choice variable of the entrepreneur. The first order condition for minimum for the












The first and the second partial derivative on the right hand side can be evaluated from
(10), and the third can be evaluated from (13).29
Equipped with these expressions, we have the following.
Proposition 5 The firm will never be 100% equity financed.
Proof. Letting D go to 0 in (14) gives a negative expression, as shown in Appendix
B.
We have established that the firm will be 100% debt financed for a suﬃciently low
funding requirement, and that the firm will never be 100% equity financed. The basic
intuition for these results can be captured by a figure. In the figure, let the cost of
verification given pure debt (equity) financing be denoted by V D (V E).




= 0 will hold for the optimal face value of debt, D∗, and hence the optimal








The figure shows the cost of capital (verification cost) for pure debt financing (V D)
and pure equity financing (V E), as a function of the funding requirement I. For a low
funding requirement, pure debt is the optimal financing due to the discontinuity of V E
in the point I = 0, which arises because a β >> 0 is required for the equity holder to
have incentives to monitor ex-post. That gives intuition for Proposition 4. For a higher
funding requirement, V D exceeds V E, and one may think that pure equity dominates.
However, having a mix of capital has a lower verification cost than pure equity, because
it is on the margin cheaper to issue debt than to issue more equity. This can be captured
by comparing the gradient of V D at a low level of debt with the gradient of V E with a
high level of equity. That gives intuition for Proposition 5.
Since we know from Proposition 5 that the optimal capital structure cannot consist
of 100% equity, a suﬃcient condition for a mixed capital structure to occur is that cE is
suﬃciently low. However, this is not a very tight suﬃcient condition, as the optimal debt
ratio will be low for a low cE. To make the equilibrium structure more concrete, let us
now consider an example. Recall that the cash flow x follows the density function f(x)
with support [xL, xH ], the funding requirement equals I, and the cost of verification is cD
and cE for debt and equity, respectively.
Example 1 f(x) =
1
xH − xL
, xL = 1.2, xH = 3.8, cD = 12 , cE =
1
5
, I = 1.4.
Denoting the optimum values by a * topscript, we get that for these parameter values,
D∗ = .80, β∗ = .47, α∗ = .57, and V ∗ = .17, where D∗ is the optimum face value of debt,
β∗ is the optimum ownership share of the outside equity holder, α∗ is the fraction of I
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financed by debt, and V ∗ is the expected verification cost.30 Hence we get a mixed capital
structure, where 57% of the capital is raised through issuing debt. By defining the debt
ratio of the firm as the (expected) value of debt, αI, divided by the value of the firm,
Ex− V , i.e., g := αI
Ex− V , we get that g
∗ = .34.
Interpreting cD as a bankruptcy cost, cD = 12 gives a bankruptcy cost of 21% of
the firm’s market value Ex− V ∗ = 2.33. This magnitude is consistent with the empirical
evidence on bankruptcy costs of 10 to 20% of the firm’s market value, as found by Andrade
and Kaplan (1998), and the 25% found by Altman (1985).
To get an idea of how the optimal capital structure changes as a function of the exoge-
nous variables, let us perform three comparative statics exercises; increasing the funding
requirement, decreasing the verification cost for equity, and changing risk by changing
the support of the distribution. The example is typical in that changing parameter and
distribution assumptions, we were unable to generate examples that did not have identical
(qualitative) comparative statics features.
By increasing the funding requirement to I = 1.5 in Example 1, and keeping the
other parameters unchanged, we get D∗ = .76, β∗ = .54, α∗ = .51, and g∗ = .33. Hence
increasing the funding requirement leads to a lower debt ratio, which is as expected given
Proposition 4. Decreasing the verification cost, by setting cE equal to e.g., .15 in Example
1, we get D∗ = .75, β∗ = .46, α∗ = .54, and g∗ = .23, hence also a decrease in the debt
ratio.
We can also decrease risk in Example 1, by setting xL = 1.3 and xH = 3.7. In that
case, we obtain D∗ = .94, β∗ = .42, α∗ = .67, and g∗ = .40. Hence, when decreasing
risk, we get that 67% of the capital is raised through issuing debt, in contrast to 57%
before, and the firm’s debt ratio increases from 34% to 40%. This result is consistent with
empirical evidence of less risky firms having a higher debt ratio than more risky firms.31
We can sum up these findings in a remark.
Remark 1 In example 1, the following gives a lower debt ratio,
i)Increasing the funding requirement
30The numbers are generated in Maple V, and the worksheets are available from the authors.





We have reformulated the classic CSV model from Townsend (1979) and Gale & Hellwig
(1985), to tackle criticisms raised against it, such as lack of subgame-perfectness and its
inability to encompass both debt and equity contracts. The implications drawn from the
reformulation were shown to be consistent with stylized empirical facts, such as strategic
defaults of debt obligations, capital mix, violations of priority rules, and a higher debt
ratio for riskier projects.
We see several avenues for further research. First, it may be of interest to introduce
dynamics in the model, to tackle such issues as dividend policy and delays in debt re-
payments. A second possible extension would be to study the interaction of investment
incentives and capital structure. For example, it can be shown that while debt finance in-
duces the manager to increase the underlying risk of the project, outside equity generates
the opposite incentive. Thus, the firm’s capital structure will aﬀect the firm’s investment
incentives both in the type of project chosen and the amount invested relative to first
best. A third extension of our work would be to discuss commitment debt (where the
creditors commit to verifying whenever the proposed repayment falls short of some tresh-
old) vis-a-vis non-commitment debt (considered in the paper) and to allow for diﬀerent
seniority in debt claims. For example, small investors in the securities market may have
commitment through their free-rider status, while banks do not. A preliminary result
from our analysis of this question indicates that non-commitment (bank) debt dominates
commitment (security) debt for projects with a cash flow distribution which is skewed
to the left, which is intuitively appealing, as the non-commitment debt would rely on
verifying less often in low cash-flow states.
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8 Appendix A
Here we prove Proposition 2, and then prove Proposition 3.
8.1 Proof of Proposition 2
For the manager to prefer announcing truthfully, it must be the case that,
U(x˜) = P (x˜)[x− βx˜+ cE] + [1− P (x˜)](1− β)x (A1)
is maximized for truthful reporting, i.e., x˜ = x. Diﬀerentiating (A1) with respect to x˜
and setting x˜ = x we obtain the diﬀerential equation,
P (x˜)β − dP (x˜)
dx˜
cE = 0 (A2)
Solving this diﬀerential equation yields,
P (x˜) = Ke
βx˜
cE (A3)
By using the corner condition P (xH) = 1, we obtain that the probability of the shareholder
accepting the announcement x˜ (with an implied oﬀer βx˜− cE to the investor) equals,
P (x˜) = e
−
β(xH − x˜)
cE , x, x˜ ∈ [xL, xH ] (A4)
















8.2 Proof of Proposition 3





x− cD for x ∈ [xL,D + cD]
D, for x ∈ [D + cD, xH ]
(A5)
There are two cases of interest, D˜ = D and D˜ < D. When D˜ = D, the true cash-flow






The reason for this is the following. Note that after D is repaid,
U(x˜) = p(x˜)[x−D − β(x˜−D) + cE] + (1− p(x˜))[(1− β)(x−D)] (A7)
= (1− β)(x−D) + p(x˜)[cE − β(x˜− x)]
Diﬀerentiating with respect to x˜ and substituting for x˜ = x, one obtains the first order
condition for truthful reporting,
dU(x)
dx
= p(x)β − dp(x)
dx
cE = 0 (A8)
Using the corner condition p(xH) = 1 and solving the diﬀerential equation, we obtain the
p(x˜) function from (A6).33
Now consider the case D˜ < D, which must occur when x < D + cD. There are
then two cases, the creditor accepting the oﬀer and the creditor rejecting the oﬀer. If







d− 1] < 0 for d = 0.
33As for pure debt and pure equity financing, it can easily be seen that the second order conditions for
maximum hold.
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creditor accepts the oﬀer, there remains cD of the cash flow, and for the equity holder to
be indiﬀerent between accepting and not accepting, the manager must oﬀer him βcD− cE
which, by continuity of p(.) is accepted with probability p(D + cD). The utility of the
manager in this case is
U(x) = q(x)[(1− β)cD + p¯cE] (A9)
Suppose now that the manager reports x˜ < x, with the implied oﬀer to the creditor of
x˜− cD, where d = x− x˜. If accepted, the manager is now left with cD + d and oﬀers the
shareholder an amount βcD−cE (where d is suﬃciently large to ensure cD+d ≥ βcD− cE
or d ≥ (1− β)cD + cE), which the shareholder accepts with probability p¯. The utility of
the manager from such misreporting becomes,
U(x˜) = q(x˜)[(1− β)cD + p¯(cE + d) + (1− p¯)(1− β)d] (A10)
= q(x˜)[(1− β)cD + p¯cE + [(1− β) + p¯β]d]





[(1− β)cD + p¯cE] + q(x)[(1− β) + p¯β] = 0 (A11)
Solving then for dU(x)
dx
= 0, using the corner condition q(D + cD) = 1, we obtain
q(x) = eψ(x−D−cD) (A12)
where ψ := (1−β)+p¯β
(1−β)cD+p¯cE , as stated in the text.
9 Appendix B
As described in the main text, we can write the expected verification as purely a function
of D, by combining equation (10) and equation (13). Diﬀerentiating V with respect to D
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in equation (10) we then get,
dV
dD



















Noting that 1− q(D+ cD) = 0 and ∂[1−p(x)]∂D =
1
cD
(xH − x)p(x) ∂β∂D , we obtain the following











































and the second order condition for minimum is
d2V
dD2
> 0. Equation (B2) and (B3) define
D∗ implicitly, and hence the optimal capital structure α∗ implicitly, since α is a function
of D from equation (11).
The proof of Proposition 5 proceeds as follows. First, purely for convenience let
























10 Appendix C: Alternative contracts
Here we consider the possibility that verification state payoﬀs can be made conditional
on both the true cash flow, x, and the announced cash flow x˜. Specifically, to obtain
truth-telling in the cheapest possible way, for any x, we consider the maximum penalty
for false reports, which is to punish such that U(x, x˜) = 0 whenever x˜ 6= x.
10.1 Debt contracts





x−min(D,x), x˜ = x
0, for x˜ < x
(C1)
where x˜ is the reported x. Notice that this contract may imply a payout to the creditor
higher than D (in the case where x is suﬃciently high, and x˜ 6= x).34 We first consider the
incentives for truth-telling for x ∈ [xL,D + cD]. The utility from truth-telling becomes
simply,
U(x) = Q(x)cD (C2)
The utility from announcing x˜, where x˜ < x,
U(x˜) = Q(x˜)(x− x˜+ cD) + (1−Q(x˜))0. (C3)
To obtain truthful reporting,
U(x)− U(x˜) = Q(x)cD −Q(x˜)(x− x˜+ cD) ≥ 0, x˜ ≤ x, x ∈ [xL, D + cD] (C4)
This is the same expression as in the original setup, and hence we obtain that for truth-
telling to occur for x on the interval [xL, D+cD] we get the same solution as in the original
34If the payout to the creditor is limited to D also when a lie is detected, it can easily be shown that
the equilibrium accept function is identical to in the original problem.
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setup. We now consider the incentives for truth-telling when x ∈ [D+ cD, xH ], and where
the announcement lies below this interval.
The utility from truth-telling becomes,
U(x) = x−D. (C5)
The utility from announcing x˜, where x˜ < D + cD,
U(x˜) = Q(x˜)(x− x˜+ cD) + (1−Q(x˜))0. (C6)
To obtain truthful reporting,
U(x)− U(x˜) = x−D −Q(x˜)(x− x˜+ cD) ≥ 0, x˜ < D + cD < x (C7)
Solving for Q(x˜) we obtain,
Q(x˜) ≤ x−D
x− x˜+ cD
, x˜ < D + cD < x (C8)
For every x, this equation defines the set of accept probabilities consistent with truth-
telling. The maximum accept probability (which is the relevant to ensure truth-telling in
the cheapest possible way) for each x is hence defined as,
x−D
x− x˜+ cD
, x˜ < D + cD < x (C9)
As can easily be verified, this function is minimized for x = xH (for every x˜).35 Hence,




, x˜ < D + cD < x (C10)
Using the corner condition Q(D + cD) = 1, we obtain the equilibrium accept probability
35Formally, xH−DxH−k+cD <
x−D








xH−x+cD , x ≤ D + cD
1, for x > D + cD
(C11)
This function is continuous, increasing, and convex, and takes on the value 1 for x =
D + cD. In other words it has the same qualitative properties as the Q(.), function
derived in the main text.
10.2 Equity contracts
We consider contracts that are linear in x conditional on truth-telling, but yields U(x) = 0





(1− β)x, x˜ = x
0, for x˜ < x
(C12)
We now derive the accept probability in this case. The utility from truth-telling becomes,
U(x) = P (x)[x− βx+ cE] + [1− P (x)][x− βx] = (1− β)x+ P (x)cE. (C13)
The utility from announcing x˜, where x˜ < x,
U(x˜) = P (x˜)(x− βx˜+ cE) + (1− P (x˜))0 = P (x˜)(x− βx˜+ cE). (C14)
For announcing truthfully to be incentive compatible, it must be the case that,
U(x)− U(x˜) = (1− β)x+ P (x)cE − P (x˜)(x− βx˜+ cE) ≥ 0, x˜ < x. (C15)
Rearranging,




For every x, this equation defines the set of accept probabilities consistent with truth-
telling. Suppose that truth-telling is hardest to obtain for x = xH (i.e., has the lowest
maximum value of P (x˜) consistent with truth-telling). Then, imposing the corner condi-
tion P (xH) = 1 yields,
P (x˜) ≤ (1− β)xH + cE
xH − βx˜+ cE
(C17)
Hence, for truth-telling to occur in the cheapest possible way,
P (x˜) =
(1− β)xH + cE
xH − βx˜+ cE
(C18)
In that case, we get an equilibrium accept probability function which equals,
P (x) =
(1− β)xH + cE
xH − βx+ cE
, x ∈ [xL, xH ] (C19)
Notice that this function is increasing and convex, and takes on the value 1 for x = xH .
In other words it has the same qualitative properties as the P (.) function derived in the
main text.36
The question is now under which conditions the P (.) function defined in (C19) ensures
truth-telling for all x (or in other words when truth-telling is hardest to obtain for x =
xH). In that case P (.) in (C19) is a solution to the problem. We have the following
result.37
Proposition 6 For suﬃciently small cE, the P (.) function given by (C19) ensures truth-
telling in equilibrium for all x.
Proof. We need to show that for suﬃciently small (but positive) cE, the P (.) function
defined by (C19) ensures truth-telling for all x. Letting cE go to zero in (C15), we obtain
36Not surprisingly, the P (.) function defined here induces a lower verification cost than the P (.) function
derived in the main text. However, we have not taken into account that making announcements verifiable
to courts may have some cost.
37The problem with generalizing this result to hold for all cE is that for suﬃciently high cE the function
defined by (C19) will not induce truth-telling for all values of x. In particular, there will exist x << xH
such that lying yields a higher payoﬀ then truth-telling. We conjecture that a P (.) function can be defined
such that there always exists (truth-telling) equilibria, but this is a rather complex variational calculus
problem that lies beyond the reach of the present paper.
32
that to ensure truth-telling,
(1− β)x− P (x˜)(x− βx˜) ≥ 0 (C20)
substituting in for P (.) implies that,
(1− β)x− (1− β)xH
xH − βx˜
(x− βx˜) (C21)





> 0;∀x < xH , x˜ < x
By the continuity of
xH − x
xH − βx˜
, there exists a strictly positive constant ε, such that
xH − x
xH − βx˜
> 0 for cE ∈ [0, ε].
We can notice that the (expected) verification cost functions for both types of financing
in this case is convex, so not surprisingly it can be shown that a mixed capital structure
can indeed be optimal also in this modified setup.
11 Appendix D: D˜ is observable to equity holders
In the main text, we assumed that D˜ was unobservable to equity holders. In this appendix,
we consider the case where D˜ is observable to the equity holders, so that the investor’s
accept probability function becomes a function of both E˜ and D˜.





x− cD for x ∈ [xL,D + cD]
D, for x ∈ [D + cD, xH ]
(D1)
There are two cases of interest, D˜ = D and D˜ < D. When D˜ = D, the true cash-flow
is not fully revealed, and we enter the equity subgame, with the same solution as before,
i.e.,





The second case occurs when D˜ < D, in which case there remains cD of the cash-flow
after the creditor is paid, which is known to the outside equity holder. Since the verifica-
tion payoﬀ to the equity holder equals βcD − cE with certainty, the manager can ensure
acceptance with probability 1 by oﬀering E˜ = βcD − cE + ε, where ε is positive but small.
Hence in the equity subgame that follows an accepted oﬀer of D˜ < D to the creditor,
the manager oﬀers βcD − cE (or arbitrarily close) and the equity holder accepts with
probability 1.
Let us find the q(.) function that induces truth-telling given x, x˜ ∈ [xL, D + cD). If
the manager announces x˜, the surplus of the manager will be,
U(x˜) = q(x˜)[cD(1− β) + cE + d] (D3)




[cD(1− β) + cE] = 0 (D4)
which yields the solution,
x˜e
x
cD(1− β) + cE (D5)
We must now determine the integration constant x˜. To induce truth-telling, the payoﬀ









{q(x)[cD(1− β) + cE]} = lim
x→(D+cD)+
{p(x) + (x−D)(1− β)}
As argued above, limx→(D+cD)+{p(x)} = p(D+cD). Denote limx→(D+cD)_ {q(x)} by q(D+
38If this condition does not hold, it is easy to see that the manager would have incentives to under- or
overreport the true cash flow.
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cD)
−. We then substitute into (D6) to obtain,
q(D + cD)
−[cD(1− β) + cE] = p(D + cD)cE + cD(1− β) (D7)
Substituting in for q(D + cD)− and p(D + cD), we can then determine x˜,
x˜e
D + cD
cD(1− β) + cE [cD(1− β) + cE] = e
−
β(xH −D − cD)





cD(1− β) + cE e
−
β(xH −D − cD)
cE cE + (1− β)cD
cD(1− β) + cE
Notice that this implies that q(D+ cD)− < 1 6= q(D+ cD) = 1, in other words the accept
function of the creditor is discontinuous in the point x = D+ cD, i.e., a small default will
imply a discontinuous jump (down) in accept probability from 1. The equilibrium then








For a low x, there is a positive probability of the creditor monitoring, while the prob-
ability of the investor monitoring (conditional on the creditor not monitoring) is zero.
For a higher x, there is a zero probability of the creditor verifying, and a positive (and
decreasing) probability of the investor verifying. Hence the monitoring responsibility is
completely specialized in equilibrium; the creditor has the role of disciplining the en-
trepreneur in bad states, and the outside investor has the role of disciplining the manager
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in good states. We can notice that the probability of the creditor verifying is discontinu-
ous in the point x = D+ cD, as in the original setup of Townsend (1979) but now without
any assumed commitment power by the creditor.39
Priority violations occur in equilibrium, since in the region x ∈ [xL, D+ cD] the lender
will accept payments less thanD without demanding a verification (with probability q(x)),
and at the same time the repayment to the investor is strictly positive. In fact, since it is
known that only cD remains after the creditor is paid out, the equity holder will accept
any oﬀer higher than βcD − cE with probability 1. As before, strategic defaults occur
in equilibrium for x ∈ [D,D + cD], by which the manager defaults even though the firm
has suﬃcient cash on hand to pay out the full debt value D. An example with exactly
the same qualitative properties as Example 1 can easily be constructed and is skipped for
brevity.
39A somewhat puzzling implication is that the ’total’ intervention probability decreases in the point
D + cD. The intuition for this goes as follows. First note that the manager is essentially the residual
claimant in the financing game, after the verification costs have been paid. He is therefore less anxious
about equity intervening than debt intervening, because cE is lower than cD. Hence to obtain truth-
telling around the point D+ cD we need the equity holder to be more lenient with the manager, so that
the intervention probability must drop in the point D+ cD.
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